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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION
STATE OF GEORGIA
GLOBAL CELLULAR,INC.,
Plaintiff/Counterclaim-Defendant,

}

CIVIL ACTION FILE NO.:
2020CV331811

Vv.

STAYMOBILE VENTURE,LLC,

Business Case Division 3

Defendant/Counterclaim-Plaintiff.

ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION
FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
The above styled matter is before the Court on Defendant-Counterclaim
Plaintiff Staymobile Venture LLC’s (“Staymobile’s”) Motion for Partial Judgme
nt
on the Pleadings, filed February 19, 2020 (the “Motion”).! Having considered the
Motion, the responsefiled June 1, 2020, the reply filed June 16, 2020, and the
pleadings, the Court enters the following order.

I
Briefing of the motion was suspended pursuant to an March 14, 2020 OrderDec
laring Statewide Judicial
Emergency issued by the Supreme Court of Georgia in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
See Order Declaring
Statewide Judicial Emergency(issued and amended March14, 2020), p. 2. See also
Order Extending Declaration of
Statewide Judicial Emergency (issued April 6, 2020); Second Order Extending Declarati
on of Statewide Judicial
Emergency (issued May 11, 2020); Third Order Extending Declaration of Statewide
Judicial Emergency (issued June
12, 2020); Fourth Order Extending Declaration of Statewide Judicial Emergency
(issued July 10, 2020). However,
after this action was transferred to the Business Case Division on May1, 2020,
the parties agreed to a briefing
schedule, and briefing on the motion was completed on June 16, 2020.
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I.

SUMMARYOF PLEADINGS

This action concerns the alleged breach of agreements involving the sale of
wireless device equipment and related services. According to the Complaint,
Plaintiff Global Cellular, Inc. (“Global”) sells wireless device protection equipment
and offers wireless device repair services. Complaint, 5.
In or around 2016, Global designed a new product knownas “The Cellairis
Bundle.” Id., 6. As described by Global, “The Cellairis Bundle is sold along with

specific terms and conditions, which all forms one product consisting of three
different elements: (1) a wireless device case; (2) a wireless device screen protector;
and (3) a limited warranty.” Id., 7. Although these elements are often sold
individually, Globalasserts the concept ofcreating one cohesive product containing
each element together with a limited warranty—a warranty that during its term
provides for the unlimited repair of the wireless device if it is damaged while being
protected by the other elements (i.e. the case and screen protector)—‘was
revolutionary in the wireless device industry.”Id., 48.
Shortly after The Cellairis Bundle was developed, Defendant Staymobile
contacted Global to negotiate a deal for Staymobile to sell Global’s products to
educational and enterprise customers. Id., 15. During the course of those
discussions, Global advised Staymobile that it had designed a new product and,
without disclosing information about The Cellairis Bundle, asked if Staymobile

would be interested in acting as Global’s sales representative for the new product.
Id., 16. Prior to revealing information about The Cellairis Bundle, Global required
that Staymobile sign a Non-Disclosure Agreement (“NDA”) which Staymobile
ultimately executed on April 11, 2017. Id., J§ 17-192
In the NDA, Staymobile acknowledged it would receive all “Confidential
Information” and “Trade Secrets” information from Global for the purpose of
evaluating and negotiating a possible business transaction and Staymobile agreed: it
may “use such information only for the Transaction and maynot use the Confidential
Information or Trade Secrets for any other Transaction” (NDA, §2.1); it would
receive “Confidential Information and Trade Secrets...in a fiduciary capacity and
solely for the benefit of [Global]” (NDA, §6); and “[t]he unauthorized use or
disclosure of any Confidential Information or Trade Secret of [Global] by
[Staymobile] may cause severe and irreparable damage to [Global] and its
Affiliates,” entitling Global to seek injunctive relief, money damages, and the
recovery of costs and expensesincluding reasonable attorneys’ fees. (NDA,§6).
After the NDA wasexecuted Global shared with Staymobile its development
of The Cellairis Bundle and its plans to market and sell the bundle to educational
and enterprise customers. Complaint, {24. Theparties also negotiated an Authorized
Seller Agreement (“ASA”) whereby Staymobile purportedly would market Global’s
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The NDAis attached to Plaintiff's Complaint as Exhibit A.
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products and would use Global asits exclusive supplier with respect to certain
customers. Id., §27.2 Although the ASA was never executed, Global asserts “the

parties agreed in writing to all material terms of the ASA and began performance
under the ASA”suchthatit “is a valid and enforceable contract.” Id., Tf 29-30.

In particular, Global asserts Staymobile agreedto the following. Staymobile
agreed to act as Global’s sales representative to K-12 education facilities, business
enterprise customers, andselect resellers. Id., 32. Staymobile agreed to use Global
as its exclusive supplierof products and specifically as “its supplier of The Cellairis
Bundle (or products that are competitive with or substitutable therefor).” Id., 4 33.
Staymobile agreed to not develop or oversee the development of a product in
competition with The Cellairis Bundle andto notsell its own warranty, guarantee,
or insurance bundled together with both a case and screen protector. Id., q 34.
Staymobile agreed to not interfere or take action adverse to Global’s intellectual
property or trade secrets nor to disclose Global’s confidential information or use it
for any purpose apart from performing under the ASA. Id., ] 35.
According to Global, following the parties’ agreement to the ASA,
Staymobile began acting as Global’s sales representative, and submitted purchase
orders for Global products, including The Cellairis Bundle, to Global. Id., 936.

However,in early 2019, Staymobile becamedelinquentin paying Global’s invoices.

4

The ASA is attachedto Plaintiff's Complaint as Exhibit B.
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Id., 37. Global alleges Staymobile owes over $650,000 in outstanding invoices as
of the filing of this action. Id., J 38-39.

Additionally, in July 2019, Global learned from a customer that Staymobile
had offered to sell the customera different “bundle” product called “The StayMobile

Protect” and which waslater rebranded “The StayMobile Bundle.” Id., 4943, 49.
Global asserts the Staymobile product combines a case, screen protector, and
warranty in one productandis a copy of The Cellairis Bundle.Id., {9 44-45. Global
alleges “Stay[m]Jobile used Global’s trade secrets and confidential information to
design, behind the scenes, its own competing product.” Id., 946.

Plaintiff asserts the following claims: (1) breach of the NDA(id., {J 51-56);
(2) breach of the ASA forfailing to pay invoices(id., J§] 57-62); (3) breach of the
ASAfor violating its confidentiality and exclusivity provisions (id., J] 63-72); (4)
misappropriation of trade secrets under the Georgia Trade Secrets Act (“GTSA”)
(id., J] 73-81); and (5) attorney’s fees and expenses pursuant to O.C.G.A. §13-6-11

(id., {{] 82-88).
Staymobile contends that at no time was The Cellairis Bundle a “rigidly
defined product”. Counterclaims of Defendant-Counterclaim Plaintiff Staymobile
Venture, LLC (“Counterclaim”), 16. Rather, it describes The Cellairis Bundle as

“nothing more than a brand,” the precise configuration of which was fluid and
contingent on the sales process and the customer’s needs andspecific requests. Id.,

qq 15-16.
Staymobile also contends the parties never agreed to the terms of the ASA,
asserting the parties exchanged approximately 100 drafts of the proposed deal
documents and ancillary agreements in the course of their negotiations but never
reached a definitive written agreement. Id., {§ 19-23. Instead, Staymobile contends

“the parties’ verbal communications, course of dealing, and oral agreements on
various material terms concerning their relationship” established a binding oral
agreement (“Oral Agreement”) under which “Staymobile agreed that it would sell
various configurations of cases, screens, and warranties under the branded moniker

“The Cellairis Bundle” to third-party consumers. Id., J] 25-26.
Pursuant to the Oral Agreement, Staymobile would sell The Cellairis Bundle
as a sales representative of “Cellairis”, and Staymobile would manageall repairs and
associated warranty claimsrelated to those sales. Id., {§ 33-34. Staymobile would
collect sales proceeds and allocate them as follows:
(i) Staymobile would tender the hard costs of [The Cellairis
Bundle] components sold to a specific customer to Global, (ii)
Staymobile would tender an amount of the sales proceeds to
Global which Global would hold to honor future warranty claims
(the “Reserve Fund”), and (iii) Staymobile and Global would
share equally in the remaining funds.
Id., 935. Staymobile asserts it was to perform all warranty repairs required under
the terms and conditions of The Cellairis Bundle with Global reimbursing
Staymobile for 100% of the laborcost of the warranty claimsandrepairs. Id., 938.
6

Accordingly to Staymobile, the parties operated largely in accordance with
the terms of the Oral Agreement between June of 2017 and May 2019, “with the
exception that Global would periodically and unilaterally amend, reject or refuse to
act in accordance with the Oral Agreementas to specific customersales. Id., 943. In
May of 2019, Global allegedly began refusing to compensate Staymobile for
watranty repairs completed on behalf of Global despite Global possessing the
Reserve Funds accrued throughthat time. Id., §44. Staymobile asserts it continued
to effectuate repairs despite Global’s refusal to compensate Staymobile per the Oral
Agreement, but eventually, in an effort to mitigate its damages, Staymobile began
withholding payments to Global on The Cellairis Bundle sales. Id., J] 45-46.
Staymobile continued to sell The Cellairis Bundle and Global continued to provide
individual components of the product to Staymobile until approximately January

2020. Id., 47.
Staymobile asserts the following claims against Global in its Counterclaim:
(1) breach of an Oral Agreement(id., [] 49-55); (2) promissory estoppel (id., Jf] 5660); (3) unjust enrichment(id., ff] 61-65); and (4) attorney’s fees and expenses under

O.C.G.A. §13-6-11 (id., J] 66-68).
Il.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Defendant Staymobile moves for judgment on the pleadings asto Plaintiff's
claims for breach of the ASA (Counts Twoand Three) and misappropriation of trade

secrets under the GTSA (Count Four).
A. Standard of Review

“After the pleadings are closed but within such time as notto delay thetrial,
any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(c).
“[W]hen deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the issue is whether the
undisputed facts appearing from the pleadings entitle the movant to judgment as a
matter of law.” Southwest Health & Wellness, L.L.C. v. Work, 282 Ga. App. 619,

623 (2006) (citing Holsapple v. Smith, 267 Ga. App. 17, 20 (2004)). Thus, “[t]he
grant of [such a motion] under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(c) is proper only wherethereis
a complete failure to state a cause of action or defense.” Schumacher v. City of
Roswell, 344 Ga. App. 135, 138 (2017) (citation omitted).
A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted and warrants... judgment on the pleadings “onlyif... its
allegations ‘disclose with certainty’ that noset of facts consistent
with the allegations could be proved that would entitle the
plaintiff to the relief he seeks.” Benedict v. State Farm Bank.

FSB, 309 Ga. App. 133, 134(1), 709 S.E.2d 314 (2011) (citation
omitted). “Put another way, ‘if, within the framework of the
complaint, evidence maybe introduced which will sustain a grant
of relief to the plaintiff, the complaint is sufficient.’” Id.

Bush v. Bank of New York Mellon, 313 Ga. App. 84, 89 (2011).
It follows that “a trial court is not a trier of fact on a motion for judgment on
the pleadings” but rather a court must only “decide whether the undisputed facts
appearing from the pleadings entitle the movant to judgment as a matter of law.”

Caldwell v. Church, 341 Ga. App. 852, 859 (2017) (citation omitted). For purposes
of the motion, “all well-pleaded material allegations by the nonmovantare taken as
true, and all denials by the movant are taken as false. But the trial court need not
adopt a party's legal conclusions based on these facts.” Work, 282 Ga. App. at 623
(citation omitted). “Further, in considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings,
a trial court may consider exhibits attached to and incorporated into the pleadings,
including exhibits attached to the complaint or the answer.” Id.
Importantly,
[t]he Georgia Civil Practice Act requires only notice pleading
and, under the Act, pleadings are to be construed liberally and
reasonably to achieve substantial justice consistent with the
statutory requirement of the Act.” Rucker v. Columbia Nat. Ins.

Co., 307 Ga. App. 444, 446(1)(a), 705 S.E.2d 270 (2010). See

O.C.G.A. §9-11-8. “[P]leadings serve only the purposeofgiving
notice to the opposing party of the general nature of the
contentions of the pleader,” DeKalb County v. Ga. Paperstock

Co., 226 Ga. 369, 370(1), 174 S.E.2d 884 (1970), and thus
“general allegations are sufficient to support a plaintiff's claim

for relief.” Davis v. Metzger, 119 Ga. App. 750, 751(2), 168
S.E.2d 866 (1969).
Racette v. Bank of Am., N.A., 318 Ga. App. 171, 180 (2012).
B. Conclusions f Law
1. Breach of the ASA — Statute ofFrauds

Defendantasserts Plaintiff's claims under the unsigned ASA fail as a matter
of law because the ASA purports to impose obligations that could not have been
completed in less than a year, making it unenforceable underthe statute of frauds.
9

Under Georgia’s statute of frauds, “agreements that cannot be performed
within one year from their making must be in writing” in order to be enforceable.
Vernon v. Assurance Forensic Accounting, LLC, 333 Ga. App. 377, 386 (2015)
(citing Ikemiya v. Shibamoto America, 213 Ga. App. 271, 272(1994)). See O.C.G.A.

§13-5-30(5) (“To make the following obligations binding on the promisor, the
promise mustbe in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith or some
person lawfully authorized by him orher:...(5) Any agreement that is not to be
performed within one year from the makingthereof...”).
However, “partial performance of a contract may suffice to remove it from
the statute of frauds.” Nacoochee Corp. v. Suwanee Inv. Partners, LLC, 275 Ga.

App. 444, 447 (2005). Specifically, the statute of frauds does not apply “[w]here
there has been performance on oneside, accepted by the other in accordance with
the contract” or “[w]here there has been such part performance of the contract as
would renderit a fraud of the party refusing to comply if the court did not compel a
performance.” O.C.G.A. §13-5-31(2)-(3). As noted by the Court of Appeals of
Georgia in Kolb v. Holmes, 207 Ga. App. 184 (1993):
The purpose of the statute of frauds is to prevent frauds and
perjuries incident to the admission ofparol testimony (Turner v.

Lorillard Co. 100 Ga. 645, 650(2), 28 S.E. 383 [1897]), but

obviously where the parties agree to enforcement of the
agreement, O.C.G.A. § 13-5-30 provides no basis to allow a
party to enforce part of an oral agreement while refusing to
perform the whole agreement(see Stringer v. Stringer, 93 Ga.

320, 20 S.E. 242 [1894]), and O.C.G.A. §13-5-31 provides
10

specific exceptions to the statute of frauds on that basis.
Kolb, 207 Ga. App. at 185.

In order for partial performance to remove the agreement from the statute of
frauds, “the part performance shown must be consistent with the presence of a
contract and inconsistent with the lack of a contract.” Hudson v. Venture Indus., Inc.,

243 Ga. 116, 118 (1979). Further, “[s]uch performance ‘must be part performance
of an essential element ofthe contract sought to be proved, and of a character which
would render it a fraud on the [plaintiff] if the [defendant] refused to comply.”
Nacoochee Corp., 275 Ga. App. at 447 (citing Norris v. Downtown LaGrange Dev.
Auth., 151 Ga. App. 343, 344 (1979)). Whether there has been partial performance
sufficient to remove a contract from thestatute of frauds is generally a question of
fact. See Perry Golf Course Dev., LLC v. Housing Auth. of City of Atlanta, 294 Ga.
App. 387, 392 (2008); Nacoochee Corp., 275 Ga. App. at 447; R.T. Patterson

Funeral Home v. Head, 215 Ga. App. 578, 581-584 (1994); White House, Inc. v.

Winkler, 202 Ga. App. 603, 607 (1992).
Here, the ASA includes variousprovisionsthat could not be completed within
one year. See, e.g., ASA, §2.1(d) (referencing Staymobile’s exclusivity with respect
to K-12 education and Resellers stating “[Global] agrees not to terminate such
specific exclusivity, or to provide notice of any pending termination of Staymobile’s
exclusivity at any time until after December 31, 2019...”); id. at §2.4 (“During the
11

Term of this Agreement and for a period of two (2) years after the expiration or
termination of this Agreement, neither Staymobile, norits Affiliates, shall assist in

any manner...any entity or Person, other than [Global] and its Affiliates, in
developing...a program for the development of a product containing either or both

a Product Piece A and/or Product Piece B combined with some elementof a Product
Piece C thereby creating one product that is purchased by the customer...”); id. at
§3.2 (“On and after the Effective Date, for a period of 3 years following the sale of
a Product to any Customer, Staymobile shall, at its own expense: (a) Respond to
Customers with respect to the general operation and use of the Product...”); id. at
§13 (“During the Term and for a period of twelve (12) monthsthereafter, [Global]
shall not...make any solicitation to employ any Staymobile employees with the job
title of Vice President of Business Development or Director of Business
Development, or higher within the internal corporate structure, without the prior
written consent of Staymobile...”). Insofar as the ASA includes obligations that
were “not to be performed within one year from the making thereof,” it would
generally be subject to the statute of frauds.
Nevertheless, Plaintiff Global has alleged partial performance of the ASA
such as to remove the agreement from the statute of frauds. For example, Global
asserts “[flollowing the agreement to the ASA, Stay[mJobile began acting as
Global’s sales representative, and submitted customer purchase orders for Global
12

products (including The Cellairis Bundle) to Global.” Complaint, 936. Consistent
with this allegation, in the ASA Global expressly appoints Staymobile as its
“exclusive independent sales representative of The Cellairis Bundle”for certain K12 education facilities and “a non-exclusive independentsales representative of The

Cellaris Bundle” for Business Enterprise Customers and grants Staymobile an
“exclusive appointment to sell The Cellairis Bundle” to certain designated
“Resellers.” ASA, §2.1(a)-(c). Further, the ASA obligates Staymobile to “market,
advertise, promote, and solicit the sale of the Products to prospective and existing
Customers through the use of marketing and promotional materials provided by
[Global]” and outlines a “Customer Purchase Order Process” the parties are to
follow. Id., §§ 3.1, 5.3.

Global further alleges “[i]n early 2019, Stay[m]Jobile became delinquent in
paying Global’s invoices for the purchases of Global’s products” and asofthe filing
of this action “owes Global over $650,000 in outstanding invoices.” Complaint, 49]
37-39. Again, at least facially consistent with these allegations, the ASA details a
compensation structure under which Global and Staymobile are “entitled to 50% of
the Gross Margin for all completed sales transactions which were solicited by
Staymobile pursuant to the terms of th[e] ASA” and requires Staymobile to make
payments to Global “within 37 days after delivery of the Productto [the] Customer.”

ASA, §§ 6.1, 6.3.
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Given the above, the Court finds Plaintiff Global “has alleged part
performance sufficient to raise a triable issue and thus withstand a motion for
judgment on the pleadings.” Perry Golf Course Dev., LLC, 294 Ga. App. at 392.
Because Global may introduce evidence within the framework of the Complaint

sufficient to state a claim for relief for breach of the ASA, the Court cannotsay that
Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on the pleadings.
Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion as to Counts Two and Three for breach of the
ASAis DENIED.

2. Misappropriation of Trade Secrets — Economic Loss Rule
Defendant asserts Global’s misappropriation of trade secrets claims, brought
under the GTSA,is impermissibly duplicative and barred under the economic loss
doctrine.
0.C.G.A. §51-1-11(a) provides in relevant part: “[N]o privity is necessary to
support a tort action; but, if the tort results from the violation of a duty whichisitself
the consequenceof a contract, the right of action is confinedto the parties and those
in privity to that contract, except in cases where the party would have a right of
action for the injury done independently of the contract...” Relatedly,
[t]he “economic loss rule” generally provides that a contracting
party who suffers purely economic losses must seek his remedy

in contract and not in tort. Under the economic loss rule, a

plaintiff can recoverin tort only those economiclossesresulting
from injury to his person or damageto his property; a plaintiff
cannot recover economic losses associated with injury to the
14

person or damageto the property of another.
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Lowe's Home Centers, Inc., 279 Ga. 77, 78 (2005) (footnotes and
citations omitted). “The purpose of the economicloss rule is to distinguish between
those actions cognizable in tort and those that may be broughtonly in contract.” ASC
Const. Equip. USA,Inc. v. City Commercial Real Estate, Inc., 303 Ga. App. 309,
316 (2010)(citing City of Cairo v. Hightower Consulting Engineers, Inc., 278 Ga.
App. 721, 728 (2006)). See also D.J. Powers Co., Inc. v. Peachtree Playthings, Inc.,
348 Ga. App. 248, 254 (2018), reconsideration denied (Nov. 15, 2018), cert.

denied (Aug. 19, 2019) (‘Economic loss’ includes “damages for...the consequent
loss of profits, unaccompanied by any claim of personal injury or damage to other

property...Courts have relegated those who suffer such economic loss to the
remedies of contract law”).
Nevertheless,

[i]t is axiomatic that a single act or course of conduct may
constitute not only a breach of contract but an independent tort
as well, if in addition to violating a contract obligation it also
violates a duty owedto plaintiff independent of contract to avoid

harming him. See, e.g., E. & M. Construction Co. Inc. v. Bob,

115 Ga. App. 127, 153 S.E.2d 641 [1967]; Rawls Bros. Co. v.
Paul, 115 Ga. App. 731, 155 S.E.2d 819 [1967]. Such an
independent harm may be found because of the relationship
betweenthe parties, or because of defendant's calling or because

of the nature of the harm. See e.g., The City and Suburban R. Co.
of Savannahv. Brauss, 70 Ga. 368 [1883] (duty of street railway
company not wrongfully to eject passenger); Floyd v. Morgan,
106 Ga. App. 332, 127 S.E.2d 31 [1962] (duty not to provide an
article represented to be safe and actually defective); Tapley v.
15

Youmans, 95 Ga. App. 161, 97 S.E.2d 365 [1957] (relationship
of landlord and sharecropper); Orkin Exterminating Co. v.
Wingate, 84 Ga. App. 750, 67 S.E.2d 250 [1951] (duty not to
spray flammable liquid aroundplaintiff's hot chimney, causing
his house to burn, in carrying out an extermination contract);
Moody v. Martin Motor Co., 76 Ga. App. 456, 46 S.E.2d 197
[1948]

(duty

to

perform

safety-related-auto

nonnegligent manner).

repairs

in

Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Stevens, 130 Ga. App. 363, 365 (1973).
Thus, where “an independentduty exists under the law, the economic loss rule

does not bar a tort claim because the claim is based on a recognized independent
duty of care and thus doesnotfall within the scope of the rule.” Hanover Ins. Co. v.

Hermosa Const. Grp., LLC, 57 F. Supp. 3d 1389, 1396 (N.D. Ga. 2014) (citation
omitted).
This principle has been applied in cases where the plaintiff
identified a statutory or common law duty that would have
existed absent the underlying contract. See Liberty Mut. Fire Ins.
Co. _v. Cagle's, Inc., No. 1:10-CV—2158-TWT, 2010 WL

5288673, at *3 (N.D.Ga. Dec. 16, 2010) (Thrash,J.) (finding that
while an insurance contract does not automatically create an
independent duty of reasonableness and goodfaith on the part of
the insurer, Georgia common law had imposed such an
independent duty, thereby excepting a breach offiduciary duty
claim from the economic loss rule under those narrow
circumstances); Waldrip v. Voyles, 201 Ga. App. 592, 594, 411

S.E.2d 765 (Ga.Ct.App.1991) (negligence claim not barred by
economic loss rule where the “requirement that the creditor
honorthe debtor's allocation of payments on multiple obligations
arises from O.C.G.A. §13-4-42, not from a contract provision”);
E & M Constr. Co. v. Bob, 115 Ga. App. 127, 128, 153 S.E.2d
641 (Ga.Ct.App.1967) (negligence claim not barred by economic
loss rule where “[i]Jndependently of any duty under a contract,
the law imposes upon a contractorthe duty not to negligently and
16

wrongfully injure and damagethe property of another.”).
HanoverIns. Co., 57 F. Supp. 3d at 1396.
Here, Defendant Staymobile argues Global’s GTSA claim is based on the
same conduct underlying the alleged breach of the NDA—i.e. using Global’s trade
secrets “to design the Stay[m]obile Bundle in violation ofthe duties in the NDA and
ASA.” Motion, p. 10 (citing Complaint, §77). Because the duties Staymobile
allegedly breachedareall contractual in nature, Staymobile urges “the GTSA claims
are impermissibly duplicative with the contract claims under the economic loss
doctrine.”Id., p. 11.

However, the GTSA “supersedes previous Georgia law on trade secrets” and
creates a statutory cause of action for the misappropriation of a trade secret
independent of any contractual obligation. Essex Grp., Inc. v. Southwire Co., 269
Ga. 553, 554 (1998) (citing Avnet, Inc. v. Wyle Labs., Inc., 263 Ga. 615 (1993)).
Insofar as “an independent duty exists under the law [i.e. the GTSA], the economic
loss rule does not bar” Plaintiff's GTSA claim. HanoverIns. Co., 57 F. Supp. 3d at
1396 (under Georgia law, holding the economic loss rule did not bar surety's
fraudulent transfer claim against construction company brought under the former
Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act, even though debtor-creditor relationship
betweenparties would not havearisen but for their contract).
Indeed, the GTSA provides remedies for the misappropriation of trade secrets
17

that are in addition to and which do not impact available contractual remedies.
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this Code section, this
article shall supersede conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other
laws of this state providing civil remedies for misappropriation
of a tradesecret.
(b) This article shall not affect: (1) Contractual duties or
remedies, whether or not based upon misappropriation of a
trade secret; provided, however, that a contractual duty to

maintain tradesecret orlimit use ofa trade secret shall not be
deemed void or unenforceable solely for lack of a durational or
geographicallimitation on the duty.
O.C.G.A. §10-1-767(a)-(b) (emphasis added). See Professional Energy Mgmt., Inc.
v. Necaise, 300 Ga. App. 223 (2009) (holding former employer's claim against
former employee for breach of confidentiality and nondisclosure agreement wasnot
preempted by the GTSA because “the GTSA explicitly provides that it does not
supersede contractual duties or remedies”).
Thus, the GTSA expressly contemplates and permits the pursuit of
“contractual duties or remedies” that are “based upon misappropriation of a trade
secret” in addition to misappropriation claims brought under the GTSA, such as
Plaintiff Global has alleged in its Complaint. It would makelittle sense for the
Georgia Legislature to draft the GTSA so as to expressly state that it “shall not
affect...[c]ontractual

duties

or

remedies,

whether

or

not

based

upon

misappropriation of a trade secret” only to then have contractual claims preempt
claims brought under the GTSA upon application of the economic loss doctrine.
18

Indeed, if the Legislature wanted contractual claims to supersede GTSA claims when
based on the same acts of misappropriation it could have easily articulated such in
the GTSA. See Avnet, Inc. v. Wyle Labs., Inc., 263 Ga. 615, 619-20 (‘All statutes
are presumed to be enacted by the legislature with full knowledge ofthe existing

condition of the law and with reference to it. They are therefore to be construed in
connection and in harmony with the existing law,...and their meaning and effect is
to be determined in connection, not only with the commonlaw andthe constitution,
999
but also with reference to other statutes and the decisions of the courts””)
(citing

Thornton v. Anderson, 207 Ga. 714, 718 (1951)).
In its Motion, Defendantcites to one Third Circuit case and twodistrict cases

where federal courts have held a misappropriation claim arising out of an alleged
breach of contract was subject to the economicloss doctrine. See Bohler-Uddeholm
Am., Inc. v. Ellwood Grp., Inc., 247 F.3d 79 (3d Cir. 2001); U.S. Data Corp. v.
RealSource,

Inc., 910 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1108 (N.D. Ill. 2012); Longo v.

Environmental Prot. & ImprovementCo.., Inc., No. 216CV09114JLLJAD, 2017 WL

2426864, at *5-6 (D.N.J. June 5, 2017). Notably, none of these cases construed
Georgia law and, as Defendant acknowledges, “no Georgia appellate court appears
to have analyzed whether or not misappropriation claims under the GTSA based on
underlying contractual breaches of a non-disclosure agreement are subject to the
economicloss doctrine.” Motion, p. 12.
19

However, at least one Georgia court has allowed a GTSA claim based upon the
“misappropriation of proprietary information” and a claim for breach of a
confidentiality and nondisclosure agreement to proceed simultaneously, noting “the
GTSA explicitly provides that it does not supersede ‘[c]ontractual duties or

remedies, whether or not based on misappropriation of a trade secret.’” 29 Professional
Energy Mgmt., Inc., 300 Ga. App. at 227 (citing O.C.G.A. §10-1-767(b)).
Having considered the pleadings and given the authorities summarized above,
Plaintiff has at least stated a claim under the GTSAsuch that dismissal based on the
pleadings would be improper. Defendant’s Motion is denied as to the GTSA claim
(Count Four).
Wl.

CONCLUSION

Givenall of the above, Defendant Staymobile’s Motion for Partial Judgment
on the Pleadings is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDEREDthis

day of July, 2020.

NORABLE KELLY
LEE ELLERBE
Jilogfe
vebecbe
Superior Court of Fulton County

Business Case Division
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
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